Ted Temzelides and Stephen Williamson have produced an intriguing paper on private money systems that is motivated both by historical experience and by the recent resurgence of private issuance. Evidence from the United States and elsewhere indicates that in the past clearing arrangements promoted the circulation of privately issued notes and eliminated discounting in regions served by the arrangements. Where clearing arrangements were absent, notes traded at par only in areas near their place of issuance. Eventually, most private currencies ceased circulating, largely because of regulatory prohibitions.
1 Those regulations are no longer in place, and thanks to recent advances in electronic technology, private currencies are now rapidly being introduced.
To study private money systems, the authors work with a two-sector, random-matching model with spatial separation that possesses equilibria in which privately issued currencies circulate. In the banking sector, any agent can issue indivisible units of currency that can be carried into the search sector and exchanged there for goods. While in the search sector, each agent will want to consume goods some fraction of the time. Agents can produce goods that others wish to consume, and they engage in production when matched with an agent who wants to consume their good. The matching process can bring together agents from any locations, and the probabilities of various matches are exogenous. Trade involves exchanges of goods for privately issued currency because there are no other means of payment (e.g., no governmentissued fiat currency) in the economy. Goods can also be produced in the banking sector, but there they can only be invested to back currencies.
Using this model, the authors study the effect of clearing arrangements on the prices at which private currencies trade, on the volume of exchange, and on welfare. Three distinctions are critical to the analysis: location, clearing, and information. The location distinction arises because the privately issued currencies are distinguishable by their place of origin relative to the locations of the agents. From an agent's perspective, a currency can be classified as locally or nonlocally issued. For the purposes of the analysis, location can also be interpreted broadly, as a proxy for knowledge about the issuer or for low redemption costs.
Redemption costs are associated with the authors' second distinction-that between environments with and without clearing arrangements. Clearing matters because the authors assume agents can redeem a currency only at the issuer's location and cannot travel to distant issuers' locations to redeem. They also assume that if a clearing arrangement, such as a clearinghouse, exists, then agents can interact with and redeem nonlocal currencies through the clearinghouse.
The third distinction critical for the analysis is whether the environment has full or private information about the quality of private currencies. A currency's quality is tied to the return on the investments that the issuer holds as backing. The authors take the full-information environment to be one in which everyone backs their currencies to the same extent with the same assets. In the private-information environment, in contrast, agents know the quality of local currencies but not nonlocal currencies.
The authors' findings hinge on these three distinctions. When there is full information about currency quality, the authors find that clearing reduces discounts on nonlocal notes and increases the volume of notes in circulation, thus increasing welfare. With private information, however, clearing can promote the circulation of low-quality notes and can increase discounts on nonlocal notes. Thus, clearing does not necessarily increase welfare. These results seem to match the historical episodes well in that they predict fairly well the differences in observed 3 outcomes with and without clearing mechanisms.
If the authors' only aim was to explain the historical episodes, then they could simply be congratulated because their model can be viewed as a success on that dimension. But they aim for their work to have relevance to today's experiences with private monies. Since the private monies now proliferating are primarily electronic in form, it is necessary to consider what role the distinctions critical to their results play in the outcomes observed with electronic monies.
The remainder of this commentary briefly describes the private electronic monies issued in recent years and assesses whether the results of the Temzelides-Williamson model are applicable to these new monies.
Private Monies Today
Each of the private electronic monies introduced in recent years falls into one of four categories: electronic tokens, barter-exchange currencies, digital cash, and stored value. 2 Some of these monies have been introduced more successfully than others.
Electronic tokens, also known as reward or loyalty currencies, are perhaps the most rapidly growing of today's private currencies. They are issued to merchants, who in turn distribute them to customers as rewards for specified actions, such as a purchase or the completion of an online survey. Frequent-flyer miles, S&H Greenpoints (the electronic version of the paper S&H Green Stamps-the first reward currency, introduced in 1896), beenz, ClickMiles, cyberdollars, and a host of other currencies fall into this category. Some of these currencies are transferable.
Barter-exchange currencies are a second type of privately issued currency. These A few years ago, attempts were made to introduce digital cash-digital alternatives to paper notes and metallic coins for use on the Internet. Digital-cash products typically required consumers and merchants to load and use issuer-supplied software that could convert monetary value in bank accounts into digital cash, and vice versa, and transfer that value electronically across participants' accounts. Attempts to introduce digital cash failed because of the high cost to potential users and the low benefit due to low merchant participation. 
Reality Meets the Temzelides-Williamson Model
Of the private monies introduced in the past few years, digital cash and general-use The situation has been different with digital cash and general-use stored value.
Merchants and often customers must have the appropriate software and hardware to exchange these electronic monies. The high cost of holding, accepting, and redeeming these currencies has hindered network growth and kept issuers from achieving the level of participation needed for a successful product launch.
This alternative interpretation has implications for the applicability of the TemzelidesWilliamson paper to electronic money. The paper assumes that all matches occur randomly, with the odds of a meeting between any two agents determined exogenously. The alternative interpretation, however, seems to require endogenous network formation. This suggests that an intentional-matching model-one in which agents choose the set of agents with which they can trade-would be more consistent with the network formation critical for electronic money.
Within the network, matches might be modeled as intentional on the part of consumers but random from the perspective of merchants. The pioneering work of Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright (2000) with intentional-matching models has already shown that such models can yield different results than random-matching models.
Clearing. In practice, digital cash and general-use stored value have been redeemable for government-issued fiat currency or bank deposits denominated in the fiat currency. These electronic monies are thus more like deposits than currency and require clearing, typically through the banking system. In the model, however, redemption and clearing occur in terms of goods for the simple reason that the model abstracts from government-issued fiat currency.
Previous research suggests that adding government-issued fiat currency to make the model more realistic could change the results. Consequently, while the model's predictions match the historical evidence well, they do not match today's experience with electronic monies.
Full versus Private Information. In the United States today there are no regulations requiring issuers to back their electronic monies. As of yet, there is no evidence a privateinformation problem with digital cash or general-use stored value because their usage has been minimal. There is, however, evidence of a private-information problem associated with phone cards, which are a type of limited-use stored value. One study of the phone cards of 70 issuers found that 53% of the cards were worthless (Mitchell 1996) . The primary reason was that issuers had never paid the phone-service providers for the service sold to customers, so the service providers deactivated the cards. This is a clear example of fraudulent issuance on a large scale, and it suggests that the private-information case probably is the more relevant one.
In conclusion, the Temzelides-Williamson model provides valuable insights about historical experiences with private paper monies, but it raises more questions than it answers regarding electronic monies. The model can, however, serve as a useful point of departure for 8 further research. A welcome addition to the literature on electronic money would be a version of the model with private information, intentional matching, and promised redemption in a government-issued fiat currency that circulates along with the private monies.
